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Abstract 
This paper assesses whether the allocation puzzle - the tendency for 
capital to flow to countries with relatively low productivity growth - is 
observed for foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, which should be 
particularly  sensitive  to  productivity  prospects.  We  look  both  at 
aggregate FDI flows and, using a new data set, at FDI flows into the 
main economic sectors. We make three points. First, we do not find 
evidence of an allocation puzzle for aggregate FDI flows. Second, we 
refine  the  aggregate  result  and  document  substantial  sectoral 
heterogeneity.  An  allocation  puzzle  is  observed  in  the  agriculture, 
construction,  mining/petroleum/utilities  and  tourism  sector.  By 
contrast, we show that  countries with faster productivity growth in 
manufacturing attract more investment in that sector. The link is even 
stronger for service sectors. Third, we document a role for financial 
openness: a country with fast productivity growth draws in more FDI 
into its service sectors only when it is financially open. We conclude 
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This paper assesses whether the allocation puzzle - the tendency for capital to ow to countries with
relatively low productivity growth - is observed for foreign direct investment (FDI) ows, which should
be particularly sensitive to productivity prospects. We look both at aggregate FDI ows and, using
a new data set, at FDI ows into the main economic sectors. We make three points. First, we do not
nd evidence of an allocation puzzle for aggregate FDI ows. Second, we rene the aggregate result
and document substantial sectoral heterogeneity. An allocation puzzle is observed in the agriculture,
construction, mining/petroleum/utilities and tourism sector. By contrast, we show that countries
with faster productivity growth in manufacturing attract more investment in that sector. The link is
even stronger for service sectors. Third, we document a role for nancial openness: a country with
fast productivity growth draws in more FDI into its service sectors only when it is nancially open.
We conclude with a discussion of some tentative explanations for the results.
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11 Introduction
Do countries with strong productivity growth attract foreign capital? According to the neoclassical
growth model (Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans) the answer is yes. Small open economies with a marginal return
to capital (MPK) that is higher than the world interest rate should attract foreign capital to nance
domestic investment. An increase in the MPK can be driven by strong productivity growth: it makes
investing domestically more protable. Furthermore, strong productivity growth increases future incomes
and, hence, current consumption (through the consumption smoothing eect). Therefore, capital inows
and productivity growth should be positively related.
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) challenge this prediction by showing that the allocation of capital
ows across developing countries and emerging markets does not follow the predictions of the neoclassical
growth model - thus casting doubt on the complementarity between foreign nance and growth. The
allocation puzzle is the observation that countries with faster productivity growth attract less capital
inows - specically, they demonstrate a negative, statistically signicant relation between overall capital
inows in percent of initial output (using data on current account decits) and productivity development.1
In scrutinizing the allocation puzzle - and, hence, the complementarity between foreign nance and
growth - this paper makes three main contributions. First, we rene the result for overall capital inows
by disaggregating these into their dierent components. The main focus is on FDI inows, which should
be particularly sensitive to productivity prospects. Second, we build a data base of FDI inows by sector
for 72 emerging market economies and developing countries that allows us to analyze the allocation of
FDI inows across the dierent sectors of these economies and, hence, to assess the allocation puzzle
also on the sectoral level.2 Third, we analyze whether nancial openness impacts the relation between
productivity growth and FDI inows and whether nancial openness plays a dierent role across sectors.
We focus on FDI inows because these should display the strongest link with investment opportuni-
ties. By contrast, aid and debt ows tend to be shaped by government decisions to a greater extent.3
Furthermore, reserve ows are to a great extent a reection of deliberate macroeconomic policies and
thus unlikely to be responsive to productivity growth as well; consider the case of China holding vast
amounts of low-return U.S. treasury bills. Instead, FDI and private equity ows are the types of capital
that should comply most with the predictions of the standard neoclassical model.4 Against this backdrop,
we would ideally like to analyze the joint allocation of FDI and portfolio equity across sectors - however,
disaggregated data is only available for FDI ows. Still, this study captures a sizable part of "private"
capital ows: FDI ows into emerging markets are not only far larger than portfolio equity ows; but
they have also overtaken debt ows as the most important form of "private" international nancing for
emerging market economies in recent years (Kose et al. (2006)).
1Note, with regard to the nature of the link between capital ows and productivity, that the standard neoclassical model
assumes technological progress to follow an exogenous process; the model implicitly assumes that the causality goes from
productivity to capital ows. This underpins Gourinchas and Jeanne's (2009) understanding of the allocation puzzle, as
countries with faster productivity growth attracting relatively less capital inows (as opposed to capital inows not having
a positive eect on productivity growth). They do not attempt to discriminate between the two possibilities in the data
(neither does the evidence we present in section 5 and 6). Empirically speaking, the allocation puzzle should therefore be
interpreted broadly: as a missing complementarity between foreign nance and productivity growth.
2See Appendix B2 for time and country coverage.
3"Other Investment" ows of the BOP can be attributed to banks, other sectors, government and monetary authorities.
Naturally, we would expect the latter two to reect government policy rather than productivity prospects.
4When comparing FDI with Portfolio Investment ows it is less clear which ow can be expected to be more linked to
productivity development. A wide literature shows the role of FDI in gaining market access, tari jumping and lowering
production costs.
2We focus on nancial openness because it is an underlying assumption of the open-economy neoclassical
model; a certain degree of nancial openness is required for capital to ow according to its predictions.
If countries/sectors were nancially closed, it would come as no surprise if (sectoral) capital inows were
not linked to (sectoral) productivity development. Hence, a "failure" of the neoclassical model might be
driven by a violation of the underlying assumption of nancial openness and not by aws in its other
key mechanisms that lead, combined with nancial openness, to the prediction that capital should ow
to countries with strong productivity growth. Figure 1 displays the median of the Quinn (1997) index
on nancial openness for the sectoral sample (see Appendix B2). It illustrates that nancial openness
is indeed a restrictive assumption: despite sharp increases in nancial openness - the median increased
from 0.375 in 1990 to 0.75 in 2006 - there is still sizable cross-country variation and many countries retain
nancial restrictions (the median of nancial openness is 0.625 across the sample period).
We arrive at three main results. First, we show at the aggregate level that FDI inows and produc-
tivity development are tightly linked across countries. Thus, the allocation puzzle - the violation of the
neoclassical growth model - does not hold for (aggregate) FDI ows, which should, indeed, comply most
with the predictions of the model.
However, second, through rening the result observed on the aggregate level and documenting sub-
stantial sectoral heterogeneity we establish a new set of allocation puzzles for FDI inows into some
important sectors of the economy - i.e. the complementarity between foreign nance and productivity
growth depends strongly on the sector in question. Specically, in a cross-section of countries' agricul-
ture, construction, tourism and mining/utility sectors, sectors with a stronger productivity development
received less capital inows.5 These sector-level allocation puzzles constitute an even starker violation
of the neoclassical growth model than the allocation puzzle for overall capital ows as they are observed
for FDI inows, which should comply most with the model's predictions. By contrast, we show that
countries with faster productivity growth in manufacturing attract more investment in that sector. The
link is even stronger for most of the service sectors: foreign nance and productivity growth are strongly
complementary in business, nance, trade and transport sectors.
Third, we show that nancial openness plays an important role in the relation between FDI inows and
productivity growth: a country with fast productivity growth draws in more capital the higher its degree
of nancial openness. This holds for FDI inows into the whole economy and for FDI inows into the
service sectors, but notably not for FDI inows into the manufacturing sector (as well as for FDI inows
into the agriculture, mining/utilities and construction sector). We discuss interesting explanations for
these results, such as the importance of special investment regimes for FDI inows into the manufacturing
sector, and the fact that a (broad) opening up of the capital account is often associated with the lifting
of investment restrictions for sectors that are traditionally shielded from foreign competition (i.e. most of
the service sectors). Furthermore, as shown by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009), nancial openness does not
signicantly impact the relation between overall net capital ows and productivity growth.6 The contrast
with the result for aggregate FDI ows (and for FDI into the service sectors) is conceptually interesting.
Theory tells us that the model should match the data more closely for nancially open countries; this is
indeed the case, but only when we focus on "private" components of overall capital ows, i.e. FDI inows.
This result is in line with the observation that the model holds better for FDI ows in general.
5Note that mining and quarrying (Sector C according to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classication) includes the petroleum sector
6They use the Chinn and Ito (2007) index, but the result holds also when using our preferred measure of nancial
openness (i.e. the Quinn index (1997, updated)
3Finally, we discuss potential explanations for the sector-level results and how a sectoral perspective can
shed light on the aggregate level. With regard to the former, potential explanations include the importance
of resource endowment and the role for FDI ows of tari-jumping, market access, transportation costs
and outsourcing.7 With regard to the latter, we discuss two channels through which a sectoral analysis can
help to understand results documented at the aggregate level. First, it follows directly from the observed
dierences between sectors that the sectoral composition of economies matters for the link between foreign
nance and productivity growth on the aggregate level: countries with a higher share of sectors for which
we document an allocation puzzle (resource dependent industries and construction) will, in general, also
not contribute to a strong link between productivity growth and capital inows on the aggregate level.
Second, we discuss a potential role for sector-level nancial openness: if productivity growth and nancial
openness dier across sectors, then the aggregate allocation puzzle might be driven by countries receiving
capital ows into a few nancially open, high-growth sectors, whereas capital outows from the remaining
low-growth sectors do not materialize due to nancial frictions. Again, this indicates that it is worthwhile
to take a closer look at the sectoral setup of economies to understand results documented at the aggregate
level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey discusses the literature. Section 3
presents the modeling framework underlying the empirical analysis and discusses important conceptual
issues. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 scrutinizes the allocation puzzle on the level of the
aggregate economy. In Section 6, FDI ows are disaggregated to the sectoral level and analyzed both
within a sector-by-sector setup and a country/sector panel. Section 7 concludes and discusses the results.
2 Literature
This paper relates to the literature on the role of nancial openness and the determinants of capital ows,
and their impact on economic development. Through establishing the allocation puzzle, Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2009) cast doubt on the complementarity between foreign capital and economic growth. In doing
so, they oer a conclusion similar to Aizenman et al. (2007) and Prasad et al. (2007), who nd that
developing countries that rely less on foreign nance grow faster. This establishes a positive relation
between domestic savings and growth, which links these papers to the literature on savings, growth and
investment and their interrelations (Feldstein and Horioka (1980), Carroll and Weil (1994)). Rodrik and
Subramanian (2008) argue that capital inows only have a positive eect in saving-constrained economies;
in investment-constrained economies foreign savings have less benecial eects as they mainly drive up
the real eective exchange rate (RER), which reduces the competitiveness of tradables and is bad for
growth (Rodrik (2008) provides evidence that an overvalued RER reduces growth).
With regard to this literature, we show that the complementarity between foreign nance and growth
depends on the type of capital ows, with the complementarity being strongest for (aggregate-level) FDI
inows. This weakens the allocation puzzle. However, through analyzing the allocation of FDI inows
into the dierent sectors of the economy, this paper establishes a new set of sector-level allocation puzzles.
Furthermore, this paper relates to the growth accounting literature. Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli
(2004) document the importance of total factor productivity (TFP) as the main source of cross-country
income dierences and, consequently, the importance of TFP growth for economic convergence. Caselli and
7Those are discussed in the concluding section. However, to explore them theoretically or to empirically discriminate
between them is subject to future research.
4Feyrer (2007) demonstrate that the marginal product of capital is actually quite similar for advanced and
developing countries once all factors of production are properly accounted for. Against this background,
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) argue that observed rates of returns - which are equalized by capital ows
- cannot be a good predictor of capital ows and that a focus on underlying productivity growth in a
basic open-economy neoclassical growth model is, therefore, the right approach to explain capital ows.
This approach is also adopted in this paper.
The literature oers several potential explanations for the allocation puzzle. One strand focuses on
the role of aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. With regard to the former, it is often emphasized that
high saving rates in Asian emerging markets are a reection of precautionary reserves built up to insure
against aggregate risks. With regard to idiosyncratic risks, Chamon and Prasad (2008) explain China's
rising household savings through increases in idiosyncratic risks associated with the transition to a market
economy. Benhima (2009) nds that the allocation puzzle can be explained through introducing idiosyn-
cratic investment risk in the neoclassical growth model (similarly, Sandri (2009) and Carroll and Jeanne
(2008)). Aguiar and Amador (2009) focus on political factors: in a model featuring political economy
frictions and a lack of commitment regarding foreign debt they show that the allocation puzzle can be
rationalized as capital will not be invested in an economy with high debt due to the risk of expropriation;
hence, governments have an incentive to pay down debt along a high-growth transition path.
Further studies focus on the role of domestic nancial development. Buera and Shin (2010) demon-
strate that capital outows and high TFP growth go hand in hand in a situation where the government
introduces widespread reforms that both open up the capital account and remove domestic distortions,
but leave nancial market distortions in place - entrepreneurs then send their savings abroad to self nance
their future investments. Similarly, Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) show that, in the absence of
a reliable store of value, nancially underdeveloped countries have to export capital when they grow fast.
By taking a sectoral perspective, this paper oers a so far unexplored avenue of analyzing the (aggre-
gate) allocation puzzle. First, explanations for the sector-level results (resource endowment, trade- and
production related factors) can potentially inform studies that aim at explaining the aggregate allocation
puzzle established by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009). Second, the sectoral analysis indicates that the
sectoral composition of economies - for example the importance of high-growth, nancially open sectors
- is an important factor for understanding the aggregate allocation puzzle.
3 Conceptual issues
This section discusses the theoretical setup and an important conceptual issue with regard to the nature
of the complementarity between capital ows and productivity growth.
3.1 Theoretical Setup
We illustrate that capital ows and productivity growth should be positively related in a simple neoclassical




where Kt is the stock of domestic physical capital, Lt the supply of labour,  the capital share and At
the productivity level.
5Consider N countries (indexed by c) with technology given by (1), identical capital shares (i.e.  =
1 = 2 = ::: = N),8 and a constant labour ratio normalized to 1 (L1;t = L2;t = ::: = LN;t =
1). Assuming a sucient degree of nancial openness, so that capital can ow across borders without























It follows that for all countries (c) the percent change of the capital stock equals the percent change of
TFP plus a term that refers to some reference country c = 1:
8c : kc = ac + '
where lower letters denote logs and ' = k1 a1. If a country experiences stronger productivity growth
than another country, it will experience a relatively stronger increase in its capital stock.10 For simplicity
suppose that the link between capital inows and kc is linear. Specically, that capital inows (scaled




= a + bkc (3)
where b is positive and between 0 and 1 and is the same across countries. A country receives more capital
inows (scaled by its size) the larger the percent increase in its capital stock.11
This motivates the following (cross-sectional) regression equation on which (or variations of which) we
will base our empirical analysis:
Inowsc;t1 t0
Yc;t0
=  + ac + "c (4)
where  = a + b' and  = b in case the theoretical prediction would hold exactly in the data. The
theoretical prediction is that  is positive - i.e. stronger productivity growth is associated with stronger
capital inows. In terms of terminology, we refer to a negative statistically signicant relation between
capital inows and productivity growth as a \strong" allocation puzzle; a non-signicant relation between
8We show the eect of allowing the capital share to vary across countries below
9A bold assumption; i.e. a typical RBC model relies on sucient adjustment costs to t the data.
10If we allow capital shares to vary across countries equation (3) becomes kc  
1 2
1 1 k1 = ac  
1 2
1 1 a1. Estimates
by Gollin (2002) suggest that the capital share is roughly constant within countries and varies between 0.2 and 0.35 across
countries. This implies that the maximum value for
1 2
1 1 is 1.23 ( 0:8
0:65) (if we assume country 1 to have the higher capital
share). To assess the potential bias, assume that both countries display a productivity growth rate of 1% and that the
capital stock of counry 2 remains unchanged; then the condition would imply that the capital stock of country 1 decreases
by 0.23 percent (despite equal productivity growth rates across the two countries). However, we argue that our theoretical
prediction is robust to dierences in the capital share across countries for two reasons. First, the dierences in capital share
are generally much lower than the maximum dierence of 0.15 (see Gollin (2002)); the bias term is accordingly much lower
than 1.23 for most country-pairs. Second, in the empirical section we analyze the link between capital ows and productivitiy
growth across countries for a long time period. Hence, the dierences in productivity growth across countries are generally
very large (up to 300 percentage points). It follows that the dierences in capital shares are too small to change the direction
of the theoretical prediction.
11A special case of this assumption would be to assume that the world capital stock is xed (i.e. K = K1+K2+:::+KN),
which would imply a one to one link between capital inows and changes in the capital stock.
6capital inows and productivity development - which implies that the coecient is statistically speaking
zero - is called a \weak" allocation puzzle.
Note that the theoretical prediction derived above holds without further assumptions when extending
the framework to the sectoral level. Importantly, we do not need to assume that all capital is sector-
specic and that sectors are independent units. First, technological spillovers between sectors - though
entirely possible - do not change the prediction that capital ows are attracted by underlying productivity
trends (which may or may not be inuenced by spillovers). Second, because equation (2) holds across all
countries and sectors it is not essential for the theoretical prediction whether all capital is sector-specic:
whereas the share of capital that is not sector-specic will be simply drawn into the highest-growth sectors
(across all dierent sectors and countries), it remains true for one specic sector that low-growth sectors
across countries receive fewer inows than high-growth sectors. The crucial assumption for this to be true
is that equation (3) holds for every sector. We believe this to be generally the case because FDI is by its
nature a direct capital ow - which is especially true for greeneld investments.12
The model of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) has very similar implications than the simple framework
outlined above. Starting from the production function given in equation (1), they build a standard small
open economy model in the tradition of Ramsey, Cass and Koopmans and derive a closed-form expression
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where  stands for the development of domestic TFP relative to the world technology frontier; specically,
t  At
A0gt   1 where g is the growth rate of productivity at the frontier (USA) - i.e. if  is positive a
country caught up relative to the United States in terms of TFP.
Net capital ows (in percent of initial GDP) depend on a convergence term that captures the - in the
absence of frictions - instantaneous convergence to the steady state from initial capital scarcity ( D
c
Yo ),13
a trend term capturing capital inows needed to hold external debt at the initial level in the absence
of productivity growth (D
t
Yo ) and two terms that capture the impact of productivity growth/catch-up
(). The rst of the latter two terms represents the positive impact of productivity growth/catch-up
on domestic investment (D
i
Yo ); the second term captures the impact of productivity growth on savings
(D
s
Y0 ) - i.e. higher productivity growth increases future income and raises, hence, current consumption.
Overall, it follows that countries with a higher productivity catch-up should have, ceteris paribus, higher
capital inows.
As the focus of this paper is on FDI inows we regard the investment channel, that we derived formally
above, as relevant for our analysis; the savings channel captures the saving decision of households rather
than the investment/saving decision of rms.14 Countries with stronger productivity growth experience
12It is, however, conceivable that the domestic banking system intermediates a share of the FDI inows - especially if
direct investment restrictions prevent investors from investing directly in their target sector.
13Contrary to what one might expect, the convergence term does not play a crucial role in determining capital ows
(according to their calibrations) as the regions are not far away from their steady state capital stocks (in 1980). This is
because they calibrate the capital stock based on a distortion  that depends on observed average investment rates. The
result is that, for example, Africa, with low average investment rates and hence huge distortions, is capital-abundant and
capital should ow out of the region. This "circular" reasoning should open up quite some scope for critique. Supportive,
and especially relevant in the current context, are, however, the results by Alfaro et al. (2008) who provide evidence for the
importance of institutions for FDI and portfolio inows (which can be subsumed under ):
14Furthermore, even when focusing on overall capital ows, the investment channel is arguably the key channel with regard
7stronger FDI inows nancing domestic investment; similarily, FDI will ow into a sector if the sector
catches up in terms of relative productivity towards the world technology frontier for that sector. This
implies the same regression as we derived in equation (4).
3.2 Interpretation of regression coecients
The standard neoclassical model assumes technological progress to follow an exogenous process and, hence,
implicitly assumes that the causality goes from productivity to capital ows. This underpins Gourinchas
and Jeanne's (2009) interpretation of the allocation puzzle, as countries with faster productivity growth
attracting relatively less capital inows (rather than capital not having a positive eect on productivity
growth). They do not attempt to discriminate between the two possibilities in the data - neither does
the evidence we present in section 5 and 6. Empirically speaking, the allocation puzzle should therefore
be interpreted broadly, as a missing complementarity between foreign nance and productivity growth.
This is also the focus of this paper. Regression coecients - in this paper we will typically regress
FDI inows on productivity development - should therefore be interpreted accordingly, as capturing this
complementarity.
However, it is interesting to consult the literature to assess which side of the complementarity is likely
to be more important. For overall inows, the evidence seems to support Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009)'s
interpretation because empirical studies could not establish a convincing positive eect of net capital
inows on (per capita) growth (Prasad et al. (2007) and Kose et al. (2006)).
This is less clear for FDI, however: if the eect of FDI inows on productivity growth is stronger
than for other types of capital inows, then positive and signicant regression coecients could be either
interpreted as capturing the productivity impacts of FDI inows or as the pull eect of productivity
growth on FDI inows. What interpretation should we believe in; i.e. does FDI cause growth? The
answer is not clear-cut. In a survey of the literature, Kose et al. (2006) summarize the major ndings
as follows: although earlier studies have found mixed results, recent studies using more sophisticated
methodologies and micro-level data sets, have been more successful in nding favorable evidence of the
benets from FDI.15 Herzer et al. (2008) nd in a sample of 28 developing countries, using cointegration
techniques, that there is neither a long-term nor a short-term eect of FDI on growth. According to
Aykut and Sayek (2007) one should note with regard to studies on the macro level that they only identify
a positive growth eect of FDI in combination with other factors (such as "absorption capacity", trade
openness (Balasubramanyam, et al. (1996)) and domestic nancial market development (Alfaro et al.
(2004)). But also this is not without criticism: Rodrik (1999) and Carkovic and Levine (2003) argue that
the eect of FDI on growth is weak16 and that most of the studies showing an eect of FDI based on
initial conditions suer from reverse causality (which emphasizes causality from productivity to capital
ows). Aykut and Sayek (2007) show that the sectoral composition of FDI ows matters. If ows get
skewed towards the manufacturing sector, there are more positive spillovers to the rest of the economy
and the eect on growth is positive. Overall the results for macro data appear inconclusive, but seem to
to the impact of productivity growth. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) argue that, because the predictions of the neoclassical
model for savings are at odds with the data, one should focus on the other channels when looking at the quantitative
predictions of the model. Through introducing uncertainty, they hence shut down the saving channel, which relies on the
assumption of perfect foresight (see their proposition 2).
15See Lipsey (2004) and Moran (2005) for further literature surveys.
16Carkovic and Levine (2003) use a dynamic GMM specication to account for endogeneity and claim that the exogenous
component of FDI does not have a causal impact on economic growth.
8favour the "pull" interpretation of our coecients - i.e. productivity growth pulling in FDI inows.
It is more important for the present study to have a look at results from more disaggregated studies
focusing on the sectoral level: a dierential impact of sectoral FDI on sectoral productivity growth across
sectors can impact the results and their interpretation as the degree of endogeneity would vary across
sectors. Furthermore, evidence of the impact of sectoral FDI on the productivity growth rates of other
sectors should be taken into account. With regard to productivity spillovers from foreign rms to domestic
rms in the same sector, the evidence is again inconclusive with various studies nding a positive eect
and other studies only a very small eect (Kose et al. (2006)). Interestingly, G org and Greenaway (2004)
argue that those studies (using cross section data) cannot establish causality because of reverse causality:
for example (borrowing their argument), if productivity in the oil sector is higher than in the food sector,
foreign companies may be attracted to the former. The results of a cross-sectional study would then
be biased in favor of a positive impact of FDI on productivity. Furthermore, Kose et al. (2006) give
a potentially important reason for the weak results on horizontal spillovers: foreign rms might try to
protect their rm-specic advantages.
Overall, the results for the sectoral level are inconclusive, but seem to, again, favour the assumption
of our underlying model - i.e. that causality runs from productivity growth to FDI inows.17
4 Data
We build one data set for the aggregate level and three data sets for the sector-level analysis: namely a
data set covering the three main sectors of the economy, a 7-sector and a 10-sector data set.18 This section
provides a brief description; further details and an overview are provided in Appendix A; an overview
on the sample coverage can be found in Appendix B. As the focus is on long-run trends, we collapse the
time dimension: "growth/development" refers to a ratio of the last year's value to the rst year's value of
the respective variable - i.e. if it is 1 the variable did not change; "in % of initial GDP" implies that the
respective variable (i.e. capital ows) is summed up over the respective years and divided by the GDP of
the rst year of available data; other variables are averaged over the range of available years.
4.1 Capital Flows
Aggregate-level data on the dierent types of capital ows is taken from the IMF's International Financial
Statistics. The overall net inows are divided in four categories: Net FDI; Net portfolio investment equity
securities; Portfolio debt and other investment; and Reserve Assets.19 From this, three other series are
derived through subtracting from overall net capital inows (1) net reserve ows, (2) aid ows and (3)
both net reserves and aid ows. The last measure is especially interesting as it takes out large parts of
ocial ows. Neglecting potentially important ocial elements of debt ows, we refer to these as "private"
17However, vertical productivity spillovers might play an important role and will be harder to deal with: Javorcik (2004)
nds that a 10% increase in the foreign presence in downstream sectors is associated with a 0.38 percent increase in output
of rms in the supplying industry. If those vertical linkages are across sectors and if they are quantitatively important one
should control for their eect.
18Sectors are classied according to ISIC Rev. 3.1. The 3-sector data set includes agriculture (sectors A and B, according
to ISIC Rev. 3.1), industry (CDEF) and services (GHIJKLMNOPQ). The 7-sector data set splits this into agriculture
(AB), mining and utilities (CE), manufacturing (D), construction (F), trade and tourism (GH), transport, storage and
communication (I), nance and business, and other services (JKLMNOPQ). Finally, the 10-sector data set disaggregates
the following sectors further: rst, CE into mining (C) and utilities (E); second, GH into trade (G) and tourism; third,
JKLMNOP into nance and business (JK), and other services (LMNOP).
19All variables are dened such that a positive sign corresponds to a net inow
9inows in the tables.
Sectoral FDI inows stem from several sources including UNCTAD, International Trade Center (ITC),
ASEAN, OECD and various country sources. Appendix A1 gives more details; Appendix B2 and B3 give
an overview of the sample.
All net capital ows series are divided by a deator and the price of investment goods given in the
6.3 PENN World tables (PWT 6.3), to get a measure of real ows in purchasing power parity (PPP).20
Following the model presented in section 2.1., this measure is rst summed up over all available years and
then scaled by the initial output/value-added of the respective country/sector (e.g. 1980) - where initial
output is taken from PWT 6.3 (Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain Series)) and value-added
from the United Nations Statistics Division.21.
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for raw FDI inows in millions of USD into the main sectors (using
the ISIC Rev. 3.1 classication). Manufacturing (In ISIC Rev. 3.1.: Sector D) received, on average, most
of the FDI inows followed by the real estate/business sector (K) and nancial intermediation (J). Average
FDI ows into mining sectors (C), transport and communication (I) and trade (G) are also sizeable. Flows
to agriculture, tourism and construction are, on average, smaller. However, there is sizable cross-country
variation in the amount of FDI ows received for all the sectors. Table 1.2 gives the summary statistics
for FDI inows (in PPP) as a fraction of initial value added. Interestingly, in % of value added, mining
and quarrying, utilities, transport storage and communication as well as nance and business industries
received more FDI than manufacturing, whereas agriculture received about 10 times less and construction
3 times less FDI.
Finally, we take the log of FDI inows (in % of initial value added) as our dependent variable (logFDI)
to dampen the impact of extreme observations.22
4.2 Productivity
Data on productivity stem from various sources. For the aggregate-level analysis, we construct TFP (At)
with the perpetual inventory method using data from PWT 6.3 on investment and output together with
the production function (1) - details are given in Appendix A2. In order to focus on long-run trends, the
TFP series is smoothed by applying an HP lter with a high smoothing parameter.23
With regard to sectoral productivity development (ProdDev), it is important to note that the analysis
relies on labour productivity due to data limitations with respect to sectoral capital stocks. Three dierent
data sets of varying degrees of disaggregation are built: A 3-sector, a 7 sector and a 10 sector database.24
Labour productivity is calculated as the ratio of value-added and the number of workers in the respective
sector; value added is from the United Nations Statistics Division and employment from the ILO (see
Appendix A3 for data sources and further details).
In order to focus only on sectors that play a signicant role in the respective countries, we exclude
sectors that both have a value-added below USD 100 million and a share in total value-added that is
20The results are robust to using the price of output instead.
21Value-added data is scaled by the price of output from PWT 6.3 to get a measure of value added in PPP
22Specically, we add one to the ratio of FDI inows over initial value added as this transformation is neutral for small
x, which gives a natural x point (compare the discussion in Yeyati et al. (2007). Results are broadly robust to not taking
logs and are available on request.
23Specically,  is set to 27:2, so that the gain of the lter is equal to 70 % at the frequency corresponding to an eight-year
cycle. The results are robust to the choice of the smoothing parameter.
24The corresponding sectoral FDI inows data is quite disaggregated and can be adjusted to the data sets described in
this section through aggregating the smaller sectors.
10below 1%.25
4.3 Financial openness and other variables
We employ two measures of nancial openness. The rst measure ("Openness (CAL)") captures the
overall openness of the capital account and is taken from Quinn (1997)26. The index ranges from 0 to
1, with most OECD countries having a value of 1 for fully open capital accounts - it takes an average
value of 0.625 for the countries of the sectoral sample. The second measure ("FDI Openness") captures
openness of a country to FDI inows and is taken from Schindler (2009); we use the 0/1 dummy variable
"direct investment inow restrictions", which is 1 if a country maintains restrictions to FDI.27 A detailed
description of other controls is provided in Appendix A4. All variables are averaged over the time-period
in question.
4.4 Comparability of the aggregate and sectoral data
Before moving to the aggregate analysis two concerns with regard to the comparability of the aggregate
and sectoral data need to be addressed. First, the comparability of the sectoral ows data with aggregate
IFS data and, second, substituting TFP with labour productivity in the sectoral analysis due to reasons
of data availability.
Ideally, total ows from the sectoral sample should match total net ows from IFS one to one. This
is not the case. Dierences to the aggregate IFS data might have several reasons: subsequent updates
of the data (incorporated in IFS but not in older sectoral data sets), dierent data issuers, dierences
between approved and realized FDI, the lack of sectoral outows data, and nally to the fact that for
some countries FDI inows had to be backed out from stock data (where valuation eects might play a
role). Encouragingly, a comparison between the total ows from the sectoral data set and IFS data shows
that the dierences are quantitatively small. The correlation between IFS FDI Inows (scaled by initial
GDP) and FDI Inows from our data set is 91%. The correlation falls to 70% when including outows
(hence, using net FDI from IFS); a drop that is driven by big outows for Hong Kong and Korea.
Following the production function (1), TFP (At) can be written as a function of labour productivity
Y












The sectoral analysis uses labour productivity as a proxy for TFP growth (due to missing data on the
capital stock for the dierent sectors). In this regard, it is encouraging to note that TFP and labour
productivity move largely in line when looking at aggregate data: the correlation coecient between TFP
growth and growth in real GDP per capita (rgdpch from PWT 6.3) is 84% for 1995-2006 using the sectoral
sample (88% for the full sample (from 1980-2006)).
25This exclusion is of practical relevance only for the 10 sector regression - and mainly for the mining sector (C), which
is very small in some of the countries.
26The updated index is available until 2006
27Note that data on sectoral openness to FDI ows is not available. It is work in progress to build such a database based
on the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
115 The Allocation Puzzle - Aggregate Level
The regressions are performed on dierent samples. The "full" sample has the biggest country coverage,
capturing a broad range of up to 95 developing countries and emerging markets.28 The "Gourinchas and
Jeanne" sample (up to 67 countries) replicates, as closely as possible, the one used by Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2009) in order to relate to their analysis. The sectoral sample captures those countries for which
we were able to gather sectoral FDI ows data (up to 64 countries).29 The focus is on the latter sample
in order pave the way for the sectoral analysis.
The following equation is estimated:
NetFlowsc = c + 1TFPGrowthc + Xc + "c
where TFPGrowth is the ratio of TFP in the last year to TFP in the rst year of available data (i.e. if
TFPGrowth is 1, then TFP did not change over the time frame). NetFlows captures the dierent types
of net inows (scaled by initial GDP). The regression is performed over two time frames: rst, from 1980
to 2007, which extends the analysis by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009). Second, focus is laid on the period
1995-2007 as this matches the period for which the data on sectoral capital ows is, on average, available.
In a rst step, we abstract from the role of controls (X) and look at unconditional relations in the data.
Tables 2.1 to 2.2 show the results for the period 1980-2007 for the full sample and the one used by
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009); they are broadly consistent across the samples. Column (1) demonstrates
the "allocation puzzle": countries with higher productivity growth received signicantly (at the 5% level)
less capital inows; column (7) shows that the result is robust to excluding aid ows.
The sectoral analysis relies on one component of overall capital ows - namely FDI ows. Hence, it is
important to further scrutinize the allocation puzzle on the aggregate level by looking at dierent types of
capital ows. This is done in column (2) through column (8). Three results are noteworthy. First, there
is no allocation puzzle for FDI: net FDI inows are signicantly positively related with TFP growth - FDI
follows the predictions of the standard neoclassical model.30 Second, the allocation puzzle is strongest for
reserves: the coecient is negative and strongly signicant - countries with a high-level of productivity
growth had a stronger growth in their reserve holdings than countries with a low productivity growth.31
Consequently, third, excluding reserve ows from the current account weakens the allocation puzzle: the
coecient on TFP growth is negative and insignicant (column (6)). Overall, the results points to the
potential importance of export-led growth strategies in explaining the allocation puzzle: high-growth
countries attract FDI into the productive export industries (which can be seen in the sectoral analysis)
and amass reserves to weaken the exchange rate.
In a next step, the focus is shifted to the period 1995 to 2007 and the sectoral sample. Table 3 and
gure 2 show that the "allocation puzzle" for overall net ows is weaker for this group of countries: the
coecient on TFP growth is now negative, but insignicant.32 On the contrary, the coecient for net
28See Appendix B1. The following high-income Countries (according to the 2006 World Bank classication) are kept in
the sample: Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Israel and Repulic of Korea
29From the 72 countries of the sectoral sample Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Russia, Serbia and Tajikistan
drop because the initial capital stock cannot be constructed from PWT 6.3 (The series are too short). Iceland is excluded
as an outlier for FDI and debt ows (the results stay qualitatively robust). There is no IFS data for Taiwan and not enough
FDI data for Guyana.
30The coecients are insignicant for the other two components of total net inows - portfolio investment in equity and
net debt ows. Hence, we observe a "weak allocation puzzle" for those two types of ows.
31This result is robust to excluding China with regards to its signicance; point estimates are markedly lower.
32Note that the share of EU accession countries is higher for the sectoral sample than for the full sample and that the
12FDI inows is again positive and signicant (at the 1% level).
Finally, to pave the way for the sectoral analysis, we zoom in on (gross) FDI inows. Column (1) of
table 4 demonstrates that the results for gross FDI inows are similar to the results for net FDI inows
(table 3): Gross FDI inows and productivity growth are signicantly positively related. In column (3) we
add a dummy for EU accession countries and a dummy for nancial centers to the regression. As expected,
signicantly more FDI is owing into EU accession countries. The point estimate on TFP growth is slightly
smaller than for the unconditional regression (column (2)). Column (4) adds initial income, nancial
development (private credit), an institutional variable directly relevant for FDI (Investment Prole), aid
ows, the average government balance, and population growth to the regression. The coecient on TFP
growth falls further in size, but it is still signicant at the 1 % level. With regard to the additional
controls we make the following observations: richer countries imported more FDI; a higher degree of
nancial development lowers the amount of FDI inows; a good investment prole attracts, indeed, FDI
inows; aid ows "attract" more FDI inows. The latter observation is interesting: a high amount of aid
ows might signal to investors that the international community is committed to the country and that
risks to investment are subsequently lower. Column (5) retains only the signicant controls; the results
are similar: there is no allocation puzzle for aggregate FDI inows.33 In section 6, we will explore the
sectoral composition of this result - the positive and signicant relation for aggregate FDI ows masks
interesting sectoral dierences.
To conclude the analysis on the aggregate level, we explore the impact of nancial openness on the
relation between productivity growth and FDI inows (see table 5 for results). Regressing FDI inows on
TFP growth, nancial openness and an interaction term between the two, shows that the marginal eect
of TFP growth on inows depends on the degree of nancial openness (column (2)): more open countries
that grow a lot attract signicantly (at the 5% level) more FDI inows whereas the coecient for the
nancially most closed economies is zero.34 In Column (4) controls are added to the regression and the
results are even stronger. The interaction term (TFPxCAL(Quinn)) grows in size and signicance: the
more nancially open a country is, the tighter is the link between FDI inows and productivity growth.
Furthermore, we arrive at evidence for an allocation puzzle for nancially closed countries: the coecient
on TFP growth for the nancially most closed countries is negative and strongly signicant. The sectoral
analysis sheds light on whether this result is driven by certain sectors or whether nancial openness has
a similar impact across sectors.
6 Into the Allocation Puzzle - A Sectoral Analysis
We assess the relation between FDI inows and productivity development using both sector-by-sector
regressions and a country/sector panel framework. This section is divided into ve parts, which include
the results for four dierent estimation frameworks and an analysis of the role of nancial openness.
First, sector-by-sector regressions allow analyzing unconditional relations in the data. Second, we use
number of EU accession countries included in the sample has an impact on the strength of the allocation puzzle as this
group of countries did receive sizable inows while growing strongly.
33As can already be seen from gure 2, Trinidad and Tobago and Estonia, two rather small countries, are important for
the strength of the link between FDI inows and TFP growth. Dropping those countries from the regression in column (5)
lowers the point estimate to 0.211. The point estimate is, however, signicant at the 10% level and we still do not observe
an allocation puzzle for FDI inows.
34This result is robust to using the full sample (10% signicance on TFPxCAL(Quinn)) or the sample used by Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2009) (5% signicance on TFPxCAL(Quinn)).
13a country/sector panel framework to assess the relative importance of the dierent dimensions of the
panel data. Third, a country/sector panel that includes interaction terms between sector dummies and
sectoral productivity growth allows estimating the slope parameter for each of the sectors separately
while controlling for country xed eects. This improves the eciency of the estimation and alleviates
endogeneity concerns stemming from slow-moving unobserved explanatory variables, but "changes" the
interpretation of the coecients. Hence, fourth, we use the same setup, but control for various country-
specic variables instead of country-xed eects. Finally, fth, we explore the role of nancial openness
using both the sector-by-sector and a country/sector panel framework.
All regressions are performed on the 3, 7 and 10-sector database.35 When comparing results on the
same coecient, we prefer the results based on the 7-sector data base over the results based on the
10-sector data base as the data is more reliable, the country coverage better and the panel more balanced.
The nature of the analysis - the fact that we are mainly interested in the relation between two variables
(FDI inows and productivity growth) - allows us to be very transparent with regard to the sample choice
since we can present the data (and the results of the sector-by-sector regressions) graphically. In gures 3
to 5, a few "large" observations and (two) outliers can be spotted directly by comparing graphs with the
titles "Focusing in" (for "large" observations) and "excl. outliers" with the original graphs, which display
all the data. We choose to present the results excluding the two outliers for Armenia (for construction
and industry), but including the "large" observations - the regressions controlling for country xed eects
or important variables are expected to suciently account for the "large" observations.36
6.1 Sector-by-Sector Analysis
We estimate the following equation for each of the sectors:
logFDIc =  + 1ProdDevc + "c
where ProdDev stands for the ratio of labour productivity in the last year to labour productivity in the
rst year of available data (i.e. if ProdDev is equal to 1, then labour productivity did not change over
the time frame) and logFDI refers to the natural logarithm of FDI inows (in % of initial value-added).
Table 6.1 and gures 3.1 and 3.2 present the results for the 3-sector data set. For the agricultural
sector, FDI inows and productivity development are unrelated - a \weak" allocation puzzle. The same
holds for the industry sector although the correlation is stronger than for agriculture. For the service
sector, FDI inows and productivity ows are strongly related (signicant at the 5 % level). The results
are qualitatively robust to excluding "large" observations along the lines of gure 3.1 and 3.2. They are
in fact stronger: the coecient is negative for agriculture and rises in size and signicance for the service
sector. The point estimate implies big eects: A 10 percentage point increase in productivity development
in the service sector increases FDI inows (in % of initial GDP) by 4.5% (5.2% when excluding "large"
observations).
However, industry as well as services conate the eect of very dierent industries (e.g. resource
extraction vs. manufacturing and transport vs. nancial intermediation and business). Hence, we move
to the 7-sector and 10-sector analysis to shed more light on the dierent subcomponents of the three main
35See Appendix A3 for a list of sectors
36Results are generally robust to estimating without "large" observations. We will notify in due course if regression results
without including those observations deviate signicantly from the results given in this paper. All results are available on
request.
14sectors. Table 6.2 and gure 4 present the results for the 7-sector data set. Splitting up the industry
sector into its components reveals that the lack of a positive signicant relation between FDI inows
and productivity is driven by a signicant, negative relation for construction industries and a negative,
but insignicant relation for mining and utilities (note that mining includes the petroleum sector). For
manufacturing, the coecient on productivity development is positive and signicant at the 1 % level. For
the services sector, the positive impact of productivity on FDI inows carries over to the trade/tourism
(GH) and transport/communication (I) industries (both coecients are signicant at the 5 % level),
whereas the estimate is not signicant for "Other Services" (JKLMNOP).
We disaggregate the data further to 10 sectors: table 6.3 and gure 5 present the results.37 Splitting up
the mining and utilities (CE) sector into its two components shows that the relation between productivity
and FDI inows is stronger for mining than for utilities. However, we still observe a \weak" allocation
puzzle for both sectors, as both coecients are insignicant (though positive).38 Focusing in on trade and
tourism (GH) gives an interesting result (which is however based on a very small sample): the positive
correlation for trade and tourism (GH) appears to be only driven by trade (G); for tourism (H), we observe
a negative relation between productivity growth and FDI inows - a \weak" allocation puzzle. Finally,
distinguishing between nance and business (JK) and government and social services (LMNOPQ) gives a
very strong, positive coecient - signicant at the 5% level - on productivity development for the nance
and business sectors: a 10 percentage point increase in productivity growth is associated with a 6.6%
increase in FDI inows (in % of initial value added) - the eect is even larger (9%) and signicant at the
1% level when excluding large observations along the lines of gure 5.
Though not in the focus of this paper, table 6.4 demonstrates that the results are robust to including
22 further OECD economies (see Appendix B3 for a list countries that are added to the sectoral sample).
To conclude, we nd a \strong" allocation puzzle for the construction (F) sector. For agriculture
(AB), mining/utilities (C) and tourism (H) we nd a \weak" allocation puzzle. The evidence speaks
against an allocation puzzle for countries' manufacturing (D), trade (G), transport/communication (I)
and business/nance (JK) sectors; the point estimates are from 60 % (for transport/communication)
to nearly 300 % (business/nance) higher for the service sectors than for the manufacturing sector. In
sections 6.3 and 6.4 we explore the robustness of these results using a country/sector panel framework.
The latter is also used in the next section, but we rst estimate one slope parameter for all sectors in
order to assess the relative importance of the dierent dimensions of the panel data.
6.2 Panel framework
We estimate the following country/sector(c,s) panel:
logFDIc;s =  + 1ProdDevc;s + c + s + "c;s
where s and c are sector and country specic eects that are potentially correlated with the regressor
and need to be eliminated through the appropriate transformation.
Table 7 presents the results of four regressions that aim at exploiting the dierent dimensions of the panel
data, specically the pooled regression (Column (1)), the regression with country xed eects (Column
37As noted above, the results are not strictly comparable as the 7 sector data set is in constant 1990 Dollars whereas the
10 sector data set is in constant 2000 Dollars.
38Note however, that the sample size drops to 29 for C and 32 for E. We, hence, prefer the results of the 7-sector regression.
15(2)), sector xed eects (Column (3)) and the between regression (4).
Column (2) and column (3) perform two dierent types of within transformation: First, Vc;s  Vc; for
the within transformation with country xed eects (column (2)) - where V stands either for logFDI or
ProdDev (note that the transformation applies to all variables) and "" denotes that the observations have
been averaged across the values of the respective index39. Second, Vc;s V;s for the within transformation
with sector xed eects (column (3)). To illustrate, consider 3 sectors (agriculture, industry and services)
and 3 countries A, B and C. When including country xed eects, the regression coecient on ProdDev
captures whether for one specic country (A, B or C) FDI inows into the service sector are bigger
than the average FDI inows into the agricultural and industrial sector, if its productivity growth is
higher than the average productivity growth across agriculture and industry - in other words, whether
FDI ows into the highest-productivity-growth sector within one country. When including industry xed
eects, the coecient captures whether for one specic sector (for example the service sector) FDI inows
into country A's service sector are higher than average FDI inows into country B's and C's service
sector, if productivity growth in country A's service sectors is higher than the average productivity
growth in the service sectors of countries B and C - in other words whether FDI ows into the highest-
productivity-growth service sectors across all countries. Finally, in column(4) the coecients relates to
whether countries with a stronger average (averaged across all sectors) productivity growth receive more
FDI inows on average (averaged across all sectors) than countries with relatively lower productivity
growth.
The results are interesting: column (1) conrms the result of the aggregate analysis: productivity
growth and FDI inows are positively related across all sectors. Column (4) demonstrates that this result
is mainly driven by the between dimension: investors invest in the countries that display the highest
productivity growth (averaged across all sectors). The regression including sector xed eects (column
(3)) shows that that investors invest to a lesser extent in the most productive sector across countries when
looking at one specic sector (column 3). There is, however, cautious evidence for investors investing in
the most productive sector within a given country (column (2)). Taking the results at face-value, investors
are able to choose a country with fast productivity growth for their investments and, to a lesser extent,
a high-growth sector within a given country. However, investors that want to invest in a certain sector
are not able to invest in the most productive sector across all countries. A possible explanation is that
sector-specic restrictions on investment limit the choice of investors between and within countries.
6.3 Panel framework with sector-specic slope parameters and xed eects
The simple panel framework employed in the last section does not allow for dierences in the slope
parameters across sectors - which are in the main interest of this paper. Those can be estimated using
the following panel setup:
logFDIc;s = 1Sector1 + ::: + 7Sector7 + 1ProdDevc;s  Sector1 +
::: + NProdDevc;s  SectorN + Xc;s + s + "c;s
where s is a country specic eects that is potentially correlated with the regressor. Sectoral FDI inows
are regressed on sector dummies (sector xed eects) and an interaction term between the productivity
39For example: a typical observation for ProdDevc; is average productivity growth across all sectors for one specic
country.
16measure and the sector dummies. We use robust standard errors and include country xed eects.40 In
this (sub)section we do not include controls (X). Note that the results of the sector-by-sector regression
can be reproduced in the panel framework of this section by simply running a pooled regression (i.e. not
including random or xed eects). The main advantage of the methodology used in this section is that it
improves the eciency of the estimation by accounting for the variance that stems from country-specic
eects. These account for all country specic variables that do not change across sectors (for example, it
is likely that the eect of broad aspects of institutional quality - such as law enforcement or bureaucratic
quality - is similar across manufacturing and transport sectors). Furthermore, purging xed eects can
account for potential omitted variable bias in case the xed eects are correlated with sectoral productivity
development (as is likely when thinking about the eect of institutional variables).
The results presented in table 8.1 are similar to the results of the sector-by-sector regressions presented
in section 6.1. However, some interesting dierences emerge. For the 3-sector framework, the results of the
sector-by-sector regressions for the industry and service sector are robust to including country xed eects:
the point estimates shown in column(1) of table 8.1 are similar to the ones presented in table 6.1 (for
the sector-by-sector regressions). On the contrary, a \strong" allocation puzzle emerges for agriculture.
The point estimate is negative and signicant at the 10% level. This result is conrmed by the 7-sector
regression (column (2)).
Disaggregating the industry sector shows an important change: the manufacturing sector's positive
and signicant correlation breaks down - it is now positive, but insignicant for the 7-sector regression
(column (2)).41 For the mining and utilities (CE) sectors we get again similar results to the sector-by-
sector regressions: the coecient on productivity growth is negative but insignicant (\weak" allocation
puzzle), whereas the relation is positive, but not signicant for both sectors, when splitting the sector.42
With regard to the services sectors, we conrm the strong relation between productivity growth and
FDI inows for the nance and business sector (JK), transport, storage and communication (I) and trade
(G): a 10 percentage point increase in productivity growth increases FDI inows (in % of GDP) by 5.9%
(1% signicance level) in the JK sector, by 1.9% (1% signicance level) in the I sector and by 3.1% in the
G sector. Furthermore, "Other Services" does now display a signicantly positive correlation (at the 10%
level). On the contrary, the coecient for the aggregate trade and tourism (GH) sector is still positive
but loses its signicance.
To summarize: including country xed eects reveals a \strong" allocation puzzle for the agricultural
sector, which displayed a \weak" allocation puzzle in the sector-by-sector analysis. For manufacturing,
the evidence is mixed, but our preferred results point to a \weak" allocation puzzle. For mining and
utilities, the evidence remains in favour of a \weak" allocation puzzle. For services sectors, the xed eect
results conrm the results of the sector-by-sector regressions: FDI inows and productivity growth are
strongly complementarity for nance and business, transport and trade.
40With regard to the model specication, we choose the xed eects framework (over the random eects framework), as
the Hausman test rejects the random eects model for the 7-sector (at the 1% level). For the 3-sector data set and 10-sector
data set the p-value of the Hausman test is 0.28 (0.25 respectively) and random eects cannot be rejected convincingly. For
the sake of comparability we still prefer to focus on the xed eects regression also for the 3-sector and 10-sector data set.
Furthermore, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test, which tests whether the variance of the intercept component in
random eects is zero, i.e. if the xed eects are all the same, rejects its null hypothesis at the 1 % level for all three data
sets.
41By contrast, the coecient remains signicant in the 10-sector regression (at the 1% level). However, as argued above,
we prefer the results of the 7-sector regression.
42However, note again that the 10-sector data set is quite limited with regard to data on those two sectors. We hence
prefer the results of the 7-sector framework
17When comparing these results with the results of the sector-by-sector regression, it is important to
note that including xed eects does have an impact on the interpretation of the regression coecients.
The within transformation (see above) tells us that we are now looking at whether countries receive above-
average (compared to other sectors in the same country) ows in one sector when this sector displays an
above-average productivity development. Essentially, the xed eects regression wipes out the variation
that stems from between countries.43 By contrast, the sector-by-sector analysis retains this dimension as
it does not control for the overall level of FDI inows into a country. This is not to say that the sector-
by-sector regressions are preferred: the xed eects framework oers a good way to control for country
specic eects, that might bias the coecients of the sector-by-sector regressions (omitted variable bias if
they are related to productivity development), and improve the precision of the estimates; but this comes
at the cost of wiping out the between country dimension.
Hence, in a nal step, we attempt to manually control for important country specic eects in order
to account for potential endogeneity, while keeping the between country dimension of the data.
6.4 Panel framework with sector-specic slope parameters and controls
In the following, we add several country-level controls (Xc) to the panel framework used in the last section.
Tables 9.1 through 9.3 present the results; the sector-by-sector regression are reproduced in column (1);
in column (2), we add nancial openness; in column (3), we add a dummy for EU Accession countries
and a dummy for nancial centers to the regression; nally, in column (4), we add investment prole, the
general government balance, private credit, initial income and aid ows.
As expected, controlling for some key variables moves the results of the sector-by-sector analysis
(displayed in column (1)) to some extent towards the results of the xed eects regression. For the
agricultural sector the coecient on productivity growth is negative, but not signicant. The coecient
for the industry sector falls in size when putting in controls, whereas it stays roughly constant (positive
and signicant) for the service sector. Table 9.2 shows - for the 7-sector data set - that, similar to the xed
eects regression, the coecient on manufacturing sector productivity development loses its signicance
(when putting the full set of controls). Contrary to the results of the xed eects regression, the \strong"
allocation puzzle for construction is robust to adding controls. With regard to the 10-sector regression,
the only qualitative change is that tourism now displays a \strong" allocation puzzle as opposed to merely
a \weak" allocation puzzle. Believing that this analysis does alleviate concerns with regard to omitted
variable bias and endogeneity stemming from slowing moving unobservables in the error term, we prefer
these results over the xed eects regression, as they the advantage that the between dimension of the
data is retained.44
With regard to the controls themselves, column (2) of tables 9.1 to 9.3 shows that country level
nancial openness has a strong and positive eect on sectoral capital inows; the importance of nancial
openness for sectoral FDI ows raises interesting questions that will be discussed in the next section.
43For example, a country that receives very high FDI inows into all its sectors would not contribute much to the overall
variance.
44The results are qualitatively robust to excluding "large" observations along the lines of gures 3 to 5
186.5 The role of nancial openness
In this section we assess - within the 3- and 7-sector setup - the impact of nancial openness both on the
level of sectoral FDI inows and on the relation between productivity growth and sectoral FDI inows.
That nancial openness impacts (positively) the level of (sectoral) FDI inows can be already seen
in tables 9.1 to 9.3. Table 10.1 demonstrates that this impact diers across sectors. Specically, we add
the Quinn index of capital account liberalization - a proxy for nancial openness - to the sector-by-sector
regressions. The results show that nancial openness has a positive and signicant impact on FDI inows
into the agricultural (AB), trade and tourism (GH) and transport, storage and communication (I) sector.
In a next step, we assess the impact of nancial openness on the marginal eect of productivity growth
on FDI inows. For this purpose, an interaction term between nancial openness and productivity devel-
opment ("CAL*ProdDev") is added to the sector-by-sector and country/sector panel regressions. Tables
10.2.1 to 10.3.2 demonstrate the results: the interaction term is signicantly positive for the three sectors
that displayed no allocation puzzle - namely in trade and tourism (GH); transport, storage and communi-
cation (I) (10.3.1); and the aggregate service sector (10.2.1/10.2.2).)45 Hence, the impact of productivity
growth on FDI inows is more positive for more nancially open countries. Interestingly, for the panel
framework, the corresponding coecient for the nancially most closed countries ("Sector*ProdDev") is
negative and signicant for trade and tourism (GH) and the aggregate service sector - i.e. the countries
with the highest degree of capital account restrictions display a \strong" allocation puzzle.
Tables 10.4 and 10.5 show that the results are largely robust to using a dierent, more FDI-specic
measure of nancial openness - specically, the index on FDI inow restrictions developed by Schindler
(2009). The main qualitative change is that the countries with the highest degree of capital account
restrictions do not display an allocation puzzle anymore. However, nancial openness has still a signi-
cantly positive eect on the marginal eect of productivity growth on FDI inows for the aggregate service
sector, trade/tourism (GH) and transport, storage and communication (I).
We conclude that nancial openness has an impact on the level of FDI inows in the agriculture and
the service sectors, whereas it impacts the relation between productivity growth and FDI inows only for
the service sectors; nancial openness does not play a role in the remaining sectors of the economy.
Insofar as investment in agriculture (AB) and mining/utilities (CE) is less driven by market incentives
but more by resource security considerations and special contracts between the source and the host
countries - i.e. special investment regimes - the results t to prior expectations.
Interesting is the dierence in the impact of nancial openness between the manufacturing (D) sector
and the service sectors. We see two potential explanations. First, the result might reect the broad
macroeconomic framework adopted by many countries. Consider governments maintaining regulations on
capital account transactions while attempting to achieve a manufacturing based export-led growth strat-
egy. FDI into the manufacturing sector is then actively encouraged and often targets special investment
zones, which are used by countries to attract FDI while "circumventing" a generally high level of capital
account and direct investment restrictions. By contrast, consider countries that broadly lift controls on
the capital account. This is often associated with more extensive liberalizing measures, which include
the reduction of investment restrictions in sectors that are traditionally shielded from foreign competition
(i.e. the service sectors) - compare for example the experience of South Korea after the Asian crisis or the
experience of the Eastern European accession countries. In this case, overall nancial openness would,
45As shown in table 10.3.2, the coecient for the transport sector (I) is not signicant when including xed eects
19indeed, only have an impact on FDI ows into the service sectors.46 A second potential explanation is
that countries are generally more open to FDI inows into their manufacturing sectors, but that there are
big cross-country dierences with regard to openness towards FDI inows into sensitive industries (such
as the nancial sector). It will be up to future research to build a suitable index of nancial openness by
sector to rene this analysis.
7 Conclusion
This paper scrutinizes the allocation puzzle - the tendency for capital to ow to countries with relatively
low productivity growth - by focusing on FDI inows. We look both at aggregate FDI ows and, using
a new data set, at FDI ows into the main economic sectors. The evidence we nd speaks strongly
against an allocation puzzle for aggregate FDI inows. Thus, the allocation puzzle - the violation of
the neoclassical growth model - does not hold for (aggregate) FDI ows, which should, indeed, comply
most with the predictions of the model. However, through rening the results of the aggregate level
and documenting substantial sectoral heterogeneity, we are able to establish a new set of (stronger)
allocation puzzles for FDI inows into some important sectors of the economy. Specically, in a cross-
section of countries' agricultural, construction, tourism and mining/utility sectors, sectors with a stronger
productivity development received less capital inows. These sector-level allocation puzzles constitute an
even starker violation of the neoclassical growth model than the allocation puzzle for overall capital ows
as they are observed for FDI inows, which should comply most with the model's predictions. By contrast,
we show that countries with faster productivity growth in manufacturing attract more investment in that
sector. The link is even stronger for most of the service sectors: foreign nance and productivity growth
are strongly complementary in business, nance, trade and transport sectors.
We also show that nancial openness plays an important role in the relation between FDI inows
and productivity growth: a country with fast productivity growth draws in more capital only when it is
nancially open. This is true for FDI inows into the whole economy and for sectoral FDI inows into the
service sectors, but notably not for FDI inows into the manufacturing sector (as well as for FDI inows
into the agriculture, mining/utilities and construction sector). However, the aggregate indices that we used
are quite crude measures of nancial openness on a sectoral level. There are more investment restrictions
in agriculture or nancial industries than in manufacturing.47 Future research should, therefore, aim at
building a data set to capture nancial openness on the sectoral level.
This paper focuses on establishing a new set of sector-level results. To discriminate - theoretically
or empirically - between the variety of potential explanations is subject to future research. However, to
conclude, we discuss some potential explanations for the sector-level results and nally, how these and a
sector-level analysis can shed light on the aggregate level.
One important potential explanation is the role of resource endowment; it is likely to play a key role
in all the sectors that display an allocation puzzle. Specically, there are two channels through which
resource endowment might have an eect. First, investment in e.g. the petroleum sector is characterized
by very high xed costs and its long-term nature. This limits the ability of foreign investors to reallocate
ows to dierent countries; investors are likely to stay even in phases of low productivity growth. Second,
46This is, of course, subject to a more rigorous empirical analysis which is left to future research.
47This claim is based on the information on direct investment restrictions contained in the IMF's Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER)
20the output of agriculture and mining/petroleum sectors is of a high strategic importance. Consider for
example FDI inows into the agricultural sectors of many developing countries with the goal to achieve
food security, or FDI into countries' mining/petroleum sectors to secure the resource inputs for the
manufacturing industries of the foreign investor. In such cases, politics may play a more important role
and might trump economic considerations such as productivity growth and the return of investment.
Further potential explanations include trade- and production-related factors: the role of tradability,
market access, transportation costs, tari-jumping and outsourcing. Consider for example an investor
who decides between investing and exporting in a model that features a xed cost to observe which
country/sector is the best to invest in. In case tari-barriers and transportation costs are not too high,
a manufacturing sector investor will decide on saving the xed cost and base her/his business model on
exporting directly. FDI into manufacturing would then be driven by secondary considerations and it
will not be worth for the investor to incur the xed costs of nding the best investment opportunities.
Furthermore, the manufacturing sector investor can always retreat to her/his domestic manufacturing
base and keep on exporting to the country in case the investment does not turn out to be successful -
the risks are then subsequently smaller. It follows that there is only a weak link between productivity
growth and FDI inows into manufacturing industries. On the contrary, given the intangibility and
non-tradability of the goods, a service sector investor has to enter the market directly, incurring huge
risks. Hence, paying the xed costs of observing sectoral productivity developments and identifying
the best investment opportunity is essential and carries much bigger benets. It follows that a service
sector investor would only invest in a country's service sector if (observed) productivity growth is strong.
Consequently, the link between productivity and FDI inows into the service sector would be stronger
than for the manufacturing sector.
We see two potential channels through which a sectoral analysis can shed light on the aggregate level.
First, it follows directly from the observed dierences between sectors that the sectoral composition of
economies matters for the link between foreign nance and productivity growth on the aggregate level:
countries with a higher share of sectors for which we document an allocation puzzle (resource dependent
industries and construction) will, in general, also not contribute to a strong link between productivity
growth and capital inows on the aggregate level.48
Second, we see a potential role for sector-level nancial openness in addressing the aggregate allocation
puzzle (which amplies the need to build such a data set): if productivity growth and nancial openness
diers across sectors, then it is conceivable that the aggregate allocation puzzle is driven by countries
receiving capital ows into a few nancially open, high-growth sectors, whereas capital outows from the
remaining low-growth sectors do not materialize due to nancial frictions. Consider a country that has an
overall very meager productivity development and a high level of nancial frictions, but a few productive,
nancially open sectors. These sectors receive quantitatively large capital inows; in contrast, capital
outows from closed, unproductive sectors do not materialize due to capital account restrictions - we
would, thus, observe capital owing into a country that is falling behind in terms of relative productivity.
On the contrary, consider a country that has an overall strong productivity development, but maintains
nancial restrictions across all (productive) sectors: the latter prevent sucient amounts of capital to ow
into the country. In both cases, it would be a violation of the underlying assumption of nancial openness
48If other types of ows follow a sectoral pattern similar to FDI inows, our results would also be helpful in "explaining"
the allocation puzzle for overall capital ows (established by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009)). Further data work should,
hence, aim at obtaining information on the sectoral composition of other types of capital ows to explore this point further
21and not aws in the neoclassical model's other key mechanisms that drive the aggregate allocation puzzle.
To conclude, this paper sheds light on the allocation puzzle through showing that it does not hold
for an important part of private capital ows (FDI) and through documenting some interesting sectoral
variation. We briey discuss several channels that might explain the sector-level results. Most of them
- resource endowment, trade- and production related factors - require deviations from the neoclassical
framework. On the contrary, the results on nancial openness show that the data matches the predictions
of the model more closely once capital is allowed to ow freely. Finally, the sector-level results indicate
that it would be worthwhile to take a closer look at the sectoral setup of economies to understand results
documented at the aggregate level.
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Figure 1: Median/P30 Openness − Sectoral Sample
Dashed horizontal line: Median openness across all countries for 1980-2006. Upper solid line: Median Openness
for respective year. Lower solid line: 30th percentile of Openness for respective year. Openness is measured by
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Figure 2: Net Capital Inflows (% of Initial GDP) and TFP Growth − Sectoral Sample − 1995−2007
TFP growth stands for the ratio of TFP in the last year to TFP in the rst year of available data - i.e.
if TFP growth is 1, then TFP did not change over the time frame. Net Capital Inows are in % of initial
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Figure 3.2: 3 Main Sectors − Log FDI Infl. (% Initial GDP)/Prod. Development (Excl. Outliers/Focusing in)
Productivity Development (X-Axis) stands for the ratio of labour productivity in the last year to labour
productivity in the rst year of available data - i.e. if Prod. Development is 1, then labour productivitiy
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Finance, Business and Other Services (Focusing in)
Productivity Development (X-Axis) stands for the ratio of labour productivity in the last year to labour
productivity in the rst year of available data - i.e. if Prod. Development is 1, then labour productivitiy
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Productivity Development (X-Axis) stands for the ratio of labour productivity in the last year to labour
productivity in the rst year of available data - i.e. if Prod. Development is 1, then labour productivitiy
did not change over the time frame.
29Table 1.1 - Summary Statistics Sectoral FDI Flows
stats AB C D E F G H I J K LMNOPQ
mean 47 434 1,262 178 98 354 62 301 712 809 86
sd 122 834 4,170 386 205 865 126 533 1,290 2,618 288
max 811 3,991 33,928 1,904 1,127 5,913 796 3,406 7,682 16,491 1,948
min -5 -0 -780 -2 -63 -99 -1 0 0 -29 -0
N 64 65 70 52 63 63 50 58 61 50 48
Millions USD
The table presents average annual FDI inows over the years of available data for the countries of the
sectoral sample (see Appendix B2). Agriculture (AB), Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D),
Utilities (E), Construction (F), Trade (G), Tourism (H), Transport, storage and communications (I),
Finance (J), Business (K) and Services (LMNOPQ) according to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classication. Note
that petroleum is included in mining and quarrying (C).
Table 1.2 - Summary Statistics Sectoral FDI Flows - Fraction of Initial Value-Added
stats AB CE C E D F GH I JK JKLMNOPQ
mean 0.07 2.03 1.17 0.97 0.75 0.28 0.58 0.78 0.81 0.70
sd 0.16 2.83 2.00 1.64 0.76 0.47 0.80 0.80 1.27 1.09
max 0.90 10.70 9.31 8.45 3.35 2.45 3.34 3.36 8.09 5.68
min -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.00
N 61 44 35 39 56 54 48 51 52 57
FDI Inows (fraction of initial value added)
The table presents FDI inows into the dierent sectors as a fraction of the initial value added in constant
dollars of the respective sector (see Appendix B2 for sample coverage). Agriculture (AB), Mining and
quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Utilities (E), Construction (F), Trade (G), Tourism (H), Transport,
storage and communications (I), Finance (J), Business (K) and Services (LMNOPQ) according to the
ISIC Rev.3.1 classication. Note that petroleum is included in mining and quarrying (C).
30Table 2.1 - Net Capital Inows (% of Initial GDP) and TFP Growth - Full Sample - 1980-2007
Total In FDI PI Equity Debt Reserves Excl. Res Excl. Aid Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFP growth -.919 .417 -.177 -.402 -.651 -.268 -.641 .006
(.415) (.157) (.203) (.270) (.235) (.231) (.328) (.186)
Const. 1.993 .056 .162 .474 .281 1.712 .153 -.128
(.507) (.175) (.229) (.306) (.268) (.357) (.383) (.276)
Obs. 95 94 93 93 95 95 93 93
R2 .122 .182 .045 .079 .239 .019 .081 .00002
Table 2.2 - Net Capital Inows (% of Initial GDP) and TFP Growth - Sample of Gourinchas and Jeanne
- 1980-2007
Total In FDI PI Equity Debt Reserves Excl. Res Excl. Aid Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFP growth -1.093 .554 -.186 -.360 -.903 -.190 -.943 -.022
(.486) (.209) (.210) (.274) (.217) (.293) (.475) (.261)
Const. 1.916 -.126 .174 .387 .631 1.285 .678 .030
(.546) (.244) (.245) (.312) (.229) (.367) (.550) (.346)
Obs. 67 67 67 67 67 67 66 66
R2 .169 .238 .048 .065 .342 .014 .143 .0002
Table 3 - Net Capital Inows (% of Initial GDP) and TFP Growth - Sectoral Sample - 1995-2007
Total In FDI PI Equity Debt Reserves Excl. Res Excl. Aid Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TFP growth -.233 .316 -.019 .238 -.266 .032 -.063 .194
(.420) (.078) (.030) (.179) (.089) (.363) (.407) (.352)
Const. .610 .002 -.023 -.258 .051 .559 .036 -.005
(.575) (.116) (.046) (.242) (.122) (.507) (.544) (.472)
Obs. 64 63 62 61 64 64 63 63
R2 .009 .165 .001 .027 .131 .0002 .0008 .01
Tables 2 to 3 - Dependent variable: Net Capital Inows (% of Initial GDP). Debt also includes "Other
Investment Assets". Column "Excl. Reserves" displays the results for taking total net inows minus net
reserve ows as the dependent variable. "Excl. Aid" takes total net inows minus aid ows as the depen-
dent variable. Column "Private" takes total net inows minus aid and net reserve ows as the dependent
variable. TFP growth stands for the ratio of TFP in the last year to TFP in the rst year of available
data - i.e. if TFP growth is 1, then TFP did not change over the time frame.
31Table 4 - FDI Inows and TFP Growth - Sectoral Sample- 1995-2007
Base Full Base Dummies All All Sig.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP growth .471 .644 .488 .413 .445
(.140) (.136) (.166) (.154) (.127)
EU Accession .391 .149
(.143) (.186)
Financial Center 2.576 2.141 2.163
(.334) (.336) (.317)
Log Initial GDP (PPP per capita) .276 .302
(.091) (.056)
Private Credit (% of GDP) -.289 -.335
(.169) (.151)
Investment Prole .090 .110
(.032) (.031)
Aid Flows (% of InitialGDP) .341 .338
(.086) (.068)
GGB (% of GDP) # 1.492
(1.663)
Population growth # .319
(9.694)
Const. -.013 -.233 -.190 -1.190 -1.395
(.196) (.188) (.215) (.398) (.239)
Obs. 64 54 54 54 54
R2 .117 .159 .737 .835 .829
Dependent variable: FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). Variables marked with # are expressed in devia-
tion from trading partners. GGB refers to the general government balance (from IFS). All variables are
described in Appendix A4. In Column (2) we restrict the sample to countries for which we have data on
all the controls that are used in column (4).
Table 5 - The role of nancial openness - Sectoral Sample- 1995-2007
Openness Interaction Sample Interaction with Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP growth .596 .0003 .135 -.535
(.101) (.286) (.375) (.191)
CAL,Quinn (Average) 1.207 -.077 .272 -1.727
(.344) (.631) (.765) (.373)




Log Initial GDP (PPP per capita) .348
(.047)




Aid Flows (% of InitialGDP) .480
(.063)
Const. -1.029 -.147 -.398 -.207
(.238) (.425) (.533) (.292)
Obs. 57 57 50 50
R2 .325 .351 .379 .895
Dependent variable: FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). Financial Openness/Capital Account Liberalization
(CAL) is measured by the Quinn Index. All variables are described in Appendix A4.
32Table 6.1: FDI inows and productivity development - 3 Sectors (Sector-by-Sector)
Agriculture Industry Services
(1) (2) (3)
Const. .04 .38 -.12
(.04) (.17) (.24)
ProdDev .02 .11 .45
(.02) (.12) (.21)
Obs. 58 55 53
R2 .005 .02 .11
Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). Industry refers to the sectors mining
and quarrying (C), manufacturing (D), utilities (E) and construction (F) according to the ISIC Rev.
3.1 classication. Services includes trade (G), tourism (H), transport, storage and communications (I),
nance and business(JK) and other services (LMNOPQ).
Table 6.2: FDI inows and productivity development - 7 Sectors (Sector-by-Sector)
AB CE D F GH I JKLMNOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const. .04 .97 .21 .40 .008 .07 .13
(.04) (.25) (.11) (.13) (.17) (.17) (.25)
ProdDev .02 -.09 .17 -.16 .30 .29 .25
(.02) (.13) (.07) (.10) (.14) (.12) (.22)
Obs. 58 43 56 50 47 49 54
R2 .005 .007 .08 .05 .1 .11 .03
Table 6.3: FDI inows and productivity development - 10 Sectors (Sector-by-Sector)
AB C D E F G H I JK LMNOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Const. .04 .35 .18 .53 .37 -.38 .45 -.05 -.04 .05
(.04) (.23) (.11) (.29) (.15) (.17) (.23) (.17) (.27) (.04)
ProdDev .03 .21 .23 .05 -.13 .56 -.23 .37 .66 -.02
(.03) (.14) (.07) (.18) (.11) (.15) (.20) (.12) (.30) (.02)
Obs. 58 29 56 32 50 25 20 49 41 17
R2 .01 .05 .14 .002 .03 .26 .07 .18 .19 .02
Table 6.4: Including all OECD countries - 7 Sectors (Sector-by-Sector)
AB CE D F GH I JKLMNOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const. .04 .85 .18 .29 -.02 .04 .18
(.03) (.22) (.10) (.11) (.14) (.16) (.24)
ProdDev .007 -.06 .20 -.10 .30 .30 .23
(.02) (.12) (.06) (.08) (.12) (.11) (.21)
Obs. 74 58 75 66 63 67 73
e(N-g)
R2 .001 .003 .11 .02 .11 .11 .02
F statistic .13 .25 10.23 1.51 6.61 8.01 1.21
Tables 6.2 to 6.4 - Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). According to the
ISIC Rev.3.1 classication: Agriculture (AB), Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Utilities
(E), Construction (F), Trade and Tourism (GH), Transport, storage and communications (I), Finance
and business (JK) and other services (LMNOPQ).
33Table 7: Dierent Dimensions of the Panel Data (Country/Sector-Panel)
Pooled Country FE Sector FE Between
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ProdDev .14 .11 .07 .28
(.05) (.06) (.07) (.09)
Obs. 347 347 347 347
e(N-g) 66 7 66
R2 .03 .02 .009 .13
Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). Column (2) includes country xed ef-
fects. Column (3) includes industry xed eects. Column (4) gives the results of the between regression.
Table 8.1: FDI inows and productivity development - 3, 7 and 10 Sectors (Country/Sector-Panel)
3 Sectors 7 Sectors 10 Sectors
(1) (2) (2)






























Obs. 166 357 377
e(N-g) 64 67 67
R2 .51 .32 .36
F statistic 24.25 12.16 12.89
Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). Country Fixed Eects, Sector Dummies
and a Constant are included (results not shown). According to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classication: Agri-
culture (AB), Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Utilities (E), Construction (F), Trade and
Tourism (GH), Transport, storage and communications (I), Finance and business (JK) and other services
(LMNOPQ). Industry refers to sectors CDEF and services to sectors GHIJKLMNOPQ.
34Table 8.2: Including all OECD countries - 3 and 7 Sectors (Country/Sector-Panel)























F statistic 35.06 16.8
Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). Country Fixed Eects, Sector Dummies
and a constant are included (results not shown). According to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classication: Agricul-
ture (AB), Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Utilities (E), Construction (F), Trade and
Tourism (GH), Transport, storage and communications (I), Finance and business (JK) and other services
(LMNOPQ). Industry refers to sectors CDEF and services to sectors GHIJKLMNOPQ.
35Table 9.1: FDI inows and productivity development - 3 Sectors (Country/Sector-Panel with controls)
Base Openness incl.Dummies incl.Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Openness (CAL) .35 .19 .12
(.16) (.16) (.15)
EU Accession .12 .10
(.09) (.12)




GGB (% of GDP) # .02
(.01)
Private Credit (% of GDP) .006
(.17)
Log Initial GDP (PPP per capita) .14
(.05)
Aid Flows (% of InitialGDP) 1.03
(.66)
Agriculture*ProdDev .02 -.009 -.04 -.06
(.03) (.03) (.06) (.05)
Industry*ProdDev .12 .10 .10 .02
(.13) (.13) (.13) (.12)
Services*ProdDev .43 .44 .37 .38
(.23) (.21) (.21) (.19)
Obs. 124 124 124 124
Countries 47 47 47 47
R2 .64 .66 .7 .72
Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). Sector Dummies are included (results
not shown). Industry refers to the sectors mining and quarrying (C), manufacturing (D), utilities (E) and
construction (F) according to the ISIC Rev. 3.1 classication. Services includes trade (G), tourism (H),
transport, storage and communications (I), nance and business (JK) and other services (LMNOPQ).
36Table 9.2: FDI inows and productivity development - 7 Sectors (Country/Sector-Panel with controls)
Base Openness incl.Dummies incl.Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Openness (CAL) .43 .24 .14
(.17) (.16) (.15)
EU Accession .16 .13
(.09) (.12)




GGB (% of GDP) # .01
(.01)
Private Credit (% of GDP) -.06
(.16)
Log Initial GDP (PPP per capita) .15
(.07)
Aid Flows (% of InitialGDP) 1.77
(.96)
AB*ProdDev .02 -.01 -.06 -.05
(.03) (.04) (.06) (.05)
CE*ProdDev -.07 -.04 -.03 -.06
(.14) (.13) (.13) (.13)
D*ProdDev .16 .14 .12 .10
(.07) (.07) (.07) (.06)
F*ProdDev -.18 -.22 -.18 -.19
(.10) (.09) (.10) (.10)
GH*ProdDev .31 .27 .16 .18
(.16) (.14) (.13) (.12)
I*ProdDev .27 .29 .24 .28
(.14) (.13) (.13) (.12)
JKLMNOPQ*ProdDev .25 .27 .27 .34
(.34) (.30) (.29) (.26)
Obs. 271 271 271 271
Countries 49 49 49 49
R2 .6 .62 .65 .67
Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). Sector Dummies are included (results
not shown). According to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classication: Agriculture (AB), Mining and quarrying (C),
Manufacturing (D), Utilities (E), Construction (F), Trade and Tourism (GH), Transport, storage and
communications (I), Finance and business (JK) and other services (LMNOPQ).
37Table 9.3: FDI inows and productivity development - 10 Sectors (Country/Sector-Panel with controls)
Base Openness incl.Dummies incl.Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Openness (CAL) .32 .19 .08
(.13) (.14) (.13)
EU Accession .11 .05
(.09) (.12)




GGB (% of GDP) # .02
(.02)
Private Credit (% of GDP) -.11
(.15)
Log Initial GDP (PPP per capita) .09
(.08)
Aid Flows (% of InitialGDP) 1.53
(.98)
AB*ProdDev .03 .007 -.02 -.01
(.03) (.03) (.05) (.05)
C*ProdDev .22 .18 .19 .17
(.14) (.14) (.15) (.14)
D*ProdDev .22 .20 .19 .18
(.07) (.07) (.07) (.06)
E*ProdDev .10 .10 .11 .09
(.20) (.20) (.20) (.20)
F*ProdDev -.15 -.18 -.16 -.17
(.12) (.11) (.11) (.11)
G*ProdDev .51 .50 .41 .42
(.12) (.14) (.11) (.12)
H*ProdDev -.31 -.34 -.31 -.36
(.16) (.18) (.16) (.18)
I*ProdDev .31 .32 .30 .32
(.14) (.13) (.14) (.12)
JK*ProdDev .62 .59 .53 .57
(.31) (.28) (.23) (.22)
LMNOPQ*ProdDev -.02 -.01 .05 .22
(.02) (.07) (.08) (.17)
Obs. 297 297 297 297
Countries 49 49 49 49
R2 .61 .62 .63 .64
Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). Sector Dummies are included (results
not shown). According to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classication: Agriculture (AB), Mining and quarrying (C),
Manufacturing (D), Utilities (E), Construction (F), Trade and Tourism (GH), Transport, storage and
communications (I), Finance and business (JK) and other services (LMNOPQ).
38Table 10.1: The impact of nancial openness on the level of FDI inows - 7 Sectors
AB CE D F GH I JKLMNOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const. -.08 .48 .06 .24 -.33 -.36 -.27
(.06) (.45) (.16) (.11) (.20) (.20) (.36)
ProdDev .005 -.02 .17 -.21 .25 .33 .28
(.03) (.13) (.08) (.10) (.13) (.12) (.28)
Openness (CAL) .19 .59 .20 .27 .59 .50 .52
(.09) (.50) (.25) (.18) (.22) (.20) (.29)
Obs. 47 36 49 44 40 42 47
R2 .14 .04 .11 .14 .2 .21 .1
Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). According to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classi-
cation: Agriculture (AB), Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Utilities (E), Construction (F),
Trade and Tourism (GH), Transport, storage and communications (I), Finance and business (JK) and
other services (LMNOPQ).
Table 10.2.1: The role of nancial openness - 3 Sectors (Sector-by-Sector)
Agriculture Industry Services
(1) (2) (3)
Const. -.11 -.29 .74
(.12) (.38) (.63)
ProdDev .02 .50 -.63
(.10) (.34) (.55)
Openness (CAL) .23 .89 -1.08
(.15) (.52) (.76)
CAL*ProdDev -.03 -.50 1.42
(.13) (.42) (.67)
Obs. 47 48 45
R2 .15 .06 .29
Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP).
Table 10.2.2: The role of nancial openness - 3 Sectors (Country/Sector-Panel)
Agriculture Industry Services
(1) (2) (3)
Sector*ProdDev .07 .24 -.82
(.39) (.35) (.38)






Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). The table is based on a regression of sec-
toral FDI Inows on sector dummies (not shown), sector dummies interacted with openness (not shown),
sector dummies interacted with productivity development and sector dummies interacted with produc-
tivity development and openness. The latter two terms assess whether the marginal eect of sectoral
productivity on FDI inows depends on the level of nancial openness.
39Table 10.3.1: The role of nancial openness -7 Sectors (Sector-by-Sector)
AB CE D F GH I JKLMNOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const. -.11 .12 .05 -.007 .52 .40 .14
(.12) (.61) (.39) (.22) (.36) (.53) (.87)
ProdDev .02 .19 .18 .02 -.49 -.20 -.06
(.10) (.26) (.32) (.18) (.31) (.36) (.79)
Openness (CAL) .23 1.23 .21 .59 -.52 -.60 -.05
(.15) (1.16) (.52) (.41) (.52) (.68) (1.32)
CAL*ProdDev -.03 -.40 -.006 -.29 .95 .78 .48
(.13) (.60) (.39) (.29) (.44) (.46) (1.16)
Obs. 47 36 49 44 40 42 47
R2 .15 .05 .11 .15 .26 .24 .1
Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). According to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classi-
cation: Agriculture (AB), Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Utilities (E), Construction (F),
Trade and Tourism (GH), Transport, storage and communications (I), Finance and business (JK) and
other services (LMNOPQ).
Table 10.3.2: The role of nancial openness -7 Sectors (Country/Sector-Panel)
AB CE D F GH I JKLMNOPQ
Sector*ProdDev .035 .13 -.032 -.05 -.47 .27 -.33
(.31) (.25) (.30) (.19) (.28) (.28) (.45)
Sector*ProdDev*CAL -.17 -.24 .16 .06 .78 .68 1.07





Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). The table is based on a regression of
FDI Inows on sector dummies (not shown), sector dummies interacted with openness (not shown), sec-
tor dummies interacted with productivity development and sector dummies interacted with productivity
development and openness. The latter two terms assess whether the marginal eect of sectoral produc-
tivity on FDI inows depends on openness.
Table 10.4: Openness to FDI (Schindler (2009)) - 3 Sectors (Sector-by-Sector)
Agriculture Industry Services
(1) (2) (3)
Const. .03 .50 -.26
(.06) (.28) (.23)
ProdDev .04 .06 .70
(.05) (.20) (.24)
FDI Openness .15 .47 -.77
(.13) (.45) (.33)
FDI Openness*ProdDev -.04 -.17 .95
(.11) (.31) (.28)
Obs. 37 37 35
R2 .11 .07 .28
Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). Industry refers to the sectors mining
and quarrying (C), manufacturing (D), utilities (E) and construction (F) according to the ISIC Rev.
3.1 classication. Services includes trade (G), tourism (H), transport, storage and communications (I),
nance and business (JK) and other services (LMNOPQ).
40Table 10.5: Openness to FDI (Schindler (2009)) - 7 Sectors (Sector-by-Sector)
AB CE D F GH I JKLMNOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const. .03 1.06 .24 .66 .14 -.15 .19
(.06) (.51) (.25) (.27) (.30) (.21) (.48)
ProdDev .04 -.14 .21 -.34 .34 .46 .32
(.05) (.31) (.18) (.21) (.25) (.13) (.42)
FDI Openness .15 .42 .66 .54 -.29 -.52 -.23
(.13) (.72) (.55) (.35) (.41) (.34) (.54)
FDI Openness*ProdDev -.04 -.14 -.27 -.28 .61 .50 .50
(.11) (.32) (.39) (.27) (.33) (.21) (.45)
Obs. 37 29 39 35 31 34 37
R2 .11 .02 .17 .24 .27 .2 .12
Dependent Variable: Sectoral FDI Inows (% of Initial GDP). According to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classi-
cation: Agriculture (AB), Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Utilities (E), Construction (F),
Trade and Tourism (GH), Transport, storage and communications (I), Finance and business (JK) and
other services (LMNOPQ).
41Appendices
A. Data Description and Sources
A1. Sectoral FDI Inows
Sector-level data on FDI inows come from several sources. The UNCTAD FDI country proles include
data on various countries; the level of sectoral disaggregation is quite high (data is present for most
of the ISIC Rev. 3.1 or ISIC Rev. 2. level-two sub-sectors). This data are extended with data from
the International Trade Center (ITC), which provides data for more recent years. The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) provides statistics for some Asian countries starting in 1999. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) gives detailed data for its member
states of which the Czech Republic, Iceland, Korea (Republic of), Mexico, Poland, and Turkey are included
in the sectoral sample; 22 OECD countries are not included in the sectoral sample (see Appendix B3).
Various country sources are used to increase the country coverage, ll the gaps, and increase the length
of the data base. Overall, sectoral capital ows data of dierent degrees of aggregation between 1990 and
2008 is obtained for 72 countries from Latin America, Asia, Africa and Eastern and Central Europe (see
Appendix B2 for the exact sample coverage).
While building the data set various issues had to be confronted. First, if data is indicated as "missing"
for one sector, but there is information for total ows that complies with IFS data and unspecied ows
are small or zero: then inows for this sector are set to zero. If unspecied ows are large and it cannot
be excluded whether unspecied contains data for the sector in question: inows are set to missing for
this sector.
Second, for various countries ows data is missing but stock data is available; in those cases ows are
backed out from stocks. Data is (mainly or partly) based on stocks for the following countries: Bangladesh,
Botswana, Cambodia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Peru, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tajik-
istan and Ukraine. Due to the potential impact of valuation eects the regressions are estimated without
these countries in a robustness check (results are robust and available on request). Furthermore, note
that the method yields negative inows for some observations (when the stock of FDI declines) - though,
also data, which are based on inows only, contain negative numbers due to prot repatriation etc.
Third, for conversion into dollars the average annual dollar exchange rate from IFS is used. Fourth,
the data for Mongolia, Mozambique, Russia and Taiwan refers to approved investment and, consequently,
the data for these countries diverges from the IFS data, which captures realized investment.
A2. Aggregate Level: Productivity Data
To construct TFP (At) we rst derive the capital stock Kt with the perpetual inventory method using data
from the 6.3 PENN World tables (PWT 6.3, Heston et. al (2006)) on investment and output (compare
Caselli (2004)). The perpetual inventory method determines the initial capital stock with the formula for
the capital stock in the steady state of the Solow model: K0 = I0
+g where g is the geometric average of
investment growth rates for the rst years of data and  is the depreciation rate. Following the literature,
we assume a  of 6 percent, a capital share  of 0.3, and calculate g using the rst 15 years of data.
Having calculated the initial capital stock, one can derive the whole path of the capital stock using data
on investment ows from PWT 6.3. The production function (1) is then used to back out the level of
technology and consequently TFP growth.
A decision has to be taken with regard to whether using the capital stock per worker, per capita or
per working-age capita. Following Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) we use capital stock per working-age
capita. (For Taiwan and Seychelles capital per worker from PWT 6.3. is used due to missing WDI data.)
42The results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to choosing the other measure.
A3. Sectoral Level: Productivity Data
Sectoral labour productivity data is constructed by dividing the value-added of the respective sector by
the numbers of workers.
Employment data are taken from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) - they are available for
most countries for all level-two ISIC Rev. 3. or ISIC Rev. 2. sub-sectors.
Disaggregated value-added data are taken from two data bases of the United Nations Statistics Di-
vision. The rst database contains estimates of value-added in constant 1990 Dollars for 6 sectors of
the economy. As it contains information on value-added for mining, manufacturing and utilities (CDE)
as well as separate data on manufacturing (D), it is possible to derive a 7-sector database that contains
value-added for mining and utilities (CE) and Manufacturing (D) separately. The second database col-
lects ocial national accounts country data on all ISIC level-two subsectors of the economy. From this we
obtain disaggregated data for mining (C), utilities (E), business and nance (JK), trade (G) and tourism
(H). Data for the other sectors are taken from the rst database (rescaled to constant 2000 Dollars)
as we prefer the data based on estimates over ocial national accounts data. This gives a database in
constant 2000 Dollars for 10 sectors of the economy. With regard to the base year note, that the o-
cial country data is too short for many countries to obtain data in constant 1990 Dollars; dierences in
base years should be kept in mind when comparing the results of the 7-sector and 10-sector regressions.
The employment and productivity data are complemented with data from the World Development Indi-
cators (mainly for agricultural productivity which is directly supplied by this database) and data from
the Groningen Growth and Development Center's (GGDC) 10-sector database (Timmer and Vries (2007)).
The following table gives an overview on the sub-sectors covered by the 3 data sets used in the analysis:
Data Set Sub-Sectors
3 sectors Agriculture (AB), Industry (CDEF) and Services (GHIJKLMNOPQ)
7 sectors AB, CE, D, F, GH, I, JKLMNOP
10 sectors AB, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, JK, LMNOP
According to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classication: Agriculture (AB), Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D),
Utilities (E), Construction (F), Trade (G), Tourism (H), Transport, storage and communications (I), Finance (J),
Business (K) and Other Services (LMNOPQ).
A4. Other variables
Openness (CAL): This measure for the overall openness of the capital account is taken from Quinn (1997)
- the updated index is available until 2006. The index ranges from 0 to 1 with most OECD countries
having a value of 1 for fully open capital accounts - it takes an average value of 0.625 for the countries of
the sectoral sample.
FDI Openness: Openness to FDI inows data are taken from Schindler (2009). Specically, we use the
0/1 dummy variable "direct investment inow restrictions", which is 1 if a country maintains restrictions
to FDI inows.
Private Credit (% of GDP): "Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial Institutions"
scaled by GDP. It is taken from the World Bank's Database on Financial Development and Structure
43(Beck et al. (2000)).
Investment prole: This measure stems from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and has three
subcomponents: (Risks to) Contract Viability/Expropriation, Prots Repatriation and Payment Delays.
The indicator ranges from 0 to 12; higher values stand for a better Investment Prole.
Aid ows (scaled by initial GDP): Aid ows are taken from Roodman (2006): He subtracts debt for-
giveness grants and osetting entries from total net aid ows at current prices taken from the Overseas
Development Assistance (ODA).
GGB (% of GDP): The general government balance (in % of GDP) is taken from the IMF (WEO). It is
expressed in deviations from trading partners.
Population growth: Growth (in percent) of total population is taken from the World Bank's World Bank
Development Indicators (WDI). It is expressed in deviations from trading partners.
Log Initial GDP (PPP per capita): Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain Series) from the PENN
World Tables 6.3 (Heston et al. (2006)).
Financial Center: Dummy that is equal to 1 if a country is a nancial center. For the sectoral sample,
only Hong Kong and Singapore are nancial centers.
EU Accession: Dummy that is equal to 1 if a country had (at some point in the sample period) the status
of an ocial EU accession candidate.
The weighting matrix is used to place variables in deviations from trading partners. It is constructed us-
ing data from the IMF's Department of Trade Statistics'(DOTS) database. Specically, for every country,
the trade partner's share in exports is calculated for 1980 and 2006, which gives two matrices; these are
interpolated between 1980 and 2006.
44B. Samples
B1. Full Sample
The sample includes all countries with a population larger than one million people. A few countries are
dropped given substantial lack of data or very poor data quality. Overall, 119 non-high-income countries
are included in the database - due to data limitations with respect to net capital ows and TFP (build
from PWT 6.3), the nal sample size is 95.
B2. Sectoral Sample










































































45B3. Other OECD countries
Sectoral FDI Inows - 22 countries:
Australia 1985-2007
Austria 1998-2007
Belgium 2002-2007
Canada 1985-2007
Denmark 1985-2007
Finland 1985-2007
France 1985-2007
Germany 1985-2007
Greece 1987-1992
Greece 2001-2007
Ireland 1985-1997
Ireland 2003-2007
Italy 1985-2006
Japan 1985-2007
Netherlands 1985-2007
Norway 1994-2007
Portugal 1985-2007
Spain 1985-2006
Sweden 1989-2006
Switzerland 1993-2007
United Kingdom 1985-2007
United States 1985-2007
46